Employers\u27 Greatest Enemy: Second-Hand Evidence in Hostile Work Environment Claims by McCollum, Jennifer D.
SMU Law Review
Volume 59 | Issue 4 Article 9
2006
Employers' Greatest Enemy: Second-Hand
Evidence in Hostile Work Environment Claims
Jennifer D. McCollum
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review
by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation








I. INTRODUCTION ........................................ 1870
II. HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT CLAIMS
GENERALLY ............................................ 1872
A . THE LAW ............................................. 1872
B. A TYPICAL CASE EXAMPLE ........................... 1873
III. IS SECOND-HAND EVIDENCE EVEN RELEVANT? . 1876
A. THE RULES OF EVIDENCE ............................. 1876
B. THE RULE 403 BALANCING ACT ...................... 1878
C. EXAMPLES OF PARTIALLY SUCCESSFUL IRRELEVANCE
A RGUMENTS .......................................... 1879
D. RELEVANT TO WHAT? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1882
IV. COURT-IMPOSED PREREQUISITES TO ADMISSION
OF SECOND-HAND EVIDENCE ....................... 1884
A. LIMITS BASED ON THE PROTECTED CLASS OF THE
THIRD PERSONS ....................................... 1885
B. PLAINTIFF'S AWARENESS OF THE INCIDENTS
INVOLVING THIRD PERSONS WHILE WORKING IN THE
ALLEGEDLY HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT .......... 1886
1. Awareness Required ............................... 1886
2. Awareness Required But is Determined by Trier of
Fact-Second Circuit .............................. 1887
3. Awareness Not Required-Third Circuit ........... 1888
V. INFREQUENTLY USED EVIDENCE RULES .......... 1891
A. INADMISSIBLE CHARACTER EVIDENCE ................ 1891
B. LACK OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE ..................... 1893
VI. HEARSAY ARGUMENTS ............................... 1893
A. POTENTIALLY SUCCESSFUL HEARSAY ARGUMENTS .... 1894
B. HEARSAY OFFERED FOR ITS EFFECT ON THE
LISTENER ............................................. 1896
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Dedman School of Law at Southern Methodist Uni-
versity, May 2007. The author would like to thank her husband JR for his love and sup-
port. She would also like to thank Adam Dougherty, an associate at the Dallas office of
Baker & McKenzie, LLP, for sharing his experiences and discussing the difficulties of de-
posing plaintiffs who make statements about their co-workers in hostile work environment
actions and the problems conducting discovery in those cases.
1869
SMU LAW REVIEW
1. Moore v. Metro Water Reclamation District of
Greater Chicago ................................... 1897
2. Velez v. Q VC ..................................... 1898
VII. CONCLUSION ........................................... 1900
I. INTRODUCTION
M "Jf Y supervisor told a dirty joke that was degrading to wo-
men while I was standing right there. He also made a pass
. at Susie down the hall-she told me. And five years ago
he had an affair with one of the secretaries." All too often this is the type
of testimony defense attorneys encounter when they conduct discovery in
hostile work environment cases. Despite the Supreme Court's ruling that
discriminatory or harassing conduct must be so severe or pervasive that it
alters the plaintiff's working environment, more and more courts are al-
lowing unsubstantiated and second-hand accounts into evidence.1
Attorneys who regularly represent employers in discrimination and
harassment suits have been troubled by the evidentiary allowances of the
lower courts in hostile work environment claims, and for good reason.
Jerome R. Watson and Richard W. Warren addressed the evidentiary is-
sues encountered in racially hostile work environment claims.2 They
stated what many defendants have already found to be true, namely that
when multiple plaintiffs allege similar race-based comments, each plain-
tiff's experiences are permitted to support the claims of co-plaintiffs that
the work environment was hostile.3
Under the heading "Limited Relevance and/or Inadmissible," the au-
thors point to Turner v. Honeywell, a Seventh Circuit decision affirming
the dismissal of a racially hostile work environment claim by an African-
American female employee. 4 The plaintiff in Turner alleged that the
word "nigger" was frequently used in her department.5 Because she
never heard the term used, and because there was no evidence of any
other discrimination that had a racial animus, summary judgment for the
defendant was appropriate. 6 Second-hand evidence of racial slurs was
not enough to independently create a hostile work environment without
the plaintiff showing something more. 7 That this case was used to sup-
port the proposition that second-hand evidence is sometimes found to
have limited relevance shows the scarcity of case law supporting defen-
1. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
2. Jerome R. Watson & Richard W. Warren, "I Heard it Through the Grapevine":
Evidentiary Challenges in Racially Hostile Work Environment Litigation, 19 LAB. LAw. 381
(2004).
3. Id. at 407.
4. Turner v. Honeywell, Micro Switch Div., 54 F. App'x 236 (7th Cir. 2002); Watson
& Warren, supra note 2, at 415.





dant employers.8 This case is unique because the plaintiff initiated a hos-
tile work environment claim even though she had never been personally
discriminated against. More often, plaintiffs who sue have experienced
one or two incidents of discrimination and then try to substantiate their
hostile work environment claim with the type of second-hand evidence
the plaintiff relied on in Turner.
Watson and Warren list certain types of second-hand evidence that are
"susceptible" to motions in limine:
e Incidents about which plaintiff did not hear about during her em-
ployment. (Relevancy, more prejudicial than probative.)
* Incidents about which plaintiff only heard-arguably, these inci-
dents do not affect plaintiff's work environment. (Relevancy, more
prejudicial than probative and lack of foundation objections.)
* Incidents occurring before and after plaintiff's employment-these
incidents could not possibly affect plaintiff's work environment. (Ir-
relevant, more prejudicial than probative.)
e Incidents with no racial implications-do not meet the requirement
that the harassment be racial in nature. (Irrelevant, prejudicial.)
* Secondhand evidence where the underlying incidents consist of
hearsay or unknown circumstances. (Hearsay, relevancy, lack of
foundation.)
* Coworker assertions unsupported by an affidavit-these lack the
appropriate foundation to be considered proper evidence of a ra-
cially hostile work environment. (Hearsay, lack of foundation.)
* Incidents occurring to others where plaintiff has failed to demon-
strate a nexus between them and the conduct affecting him-for ex-
ample, in some jurisdictions, the court would require a plaintiff to
demonstrate that a coworker's failure to promote claim, if used as
evidence of a hostile work environment, has some tie-in to plaintiff's
work environment. (Irrelevant, prejudicial.)
" Incidents not directed at plaintiff. (Relevancy, prejudicial.)
" Incidents that fall outside the statute of limitations period. (Irrele-
vant, prejudicial.)
- Secondhand evidence that supports discrimination as opposed to a
harassment claim-unduly harsh discipline, failure to hire or wrong-
ful termination based on race. (Irrelevant, prejudicial.) 9
The authors merely note that defendants "should aggressively attack vir-
tually all second-hand evidence through the Rules of Evidence. These
objections work before some courts, but others deny them. A plaintiff's
greatest ally is the totality of the circumstances approach ... "10 In short,
the authors identify evidentiary objections that might be made to combat
second-hand evidence, but they do not provide an adequate analysis of
the case law.
This Comment addresses evidentiary issues in hostile work environ-
ment claims from the defendant's perspective. Section II summarizes the
8. See Watson & Warren, supra note 2, at 415.
9. Id. at 415-16.
10. Id. at 416.
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current status of hostile work environment law in terms of the statute and
United States Supreme Court decisions. It then illustrates several of the
evidentiary problems that often arise by setting out an example case.
Section III addresses the most obvious problem with second-hand evi-
dence-relevance and probative value under Federal Rules of Evidence
401 and 403. The fourth section identifies prerequisites that some courts
independently require before they admit second-hand evidence, namely
that the third person be a member of the plaintiff's same protected class
or that the plaintiff be aware of the second-hand evidence during the time
she was allegedly subjected to a hostile work environment. The next sec-
tion addresses attempts to attack second-hand evidence as inadmissible
character evidence of defendant-individuals, or for the witness' lack of
personal knowledge. Section VI examines hearsay arguments and dis-
cusses decisions allowing hearsay offered for its effect on the speaker.
Practical problems and the consequences of allowing second-hand evi-
dence into trials are addressed throughout.
In examining the case law, an alarming pattern of admissibility
emerges. The end determination can only be that much tougher adher-
ence to the Rules of Evidence and more standard procedures for han-
dling second-hand evidence are needed in order to preserve the basic
function of our civil legal system-compensating truly injured parties in
an effort to make them whole again.
II. HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT CLAIMS GENERALLY
A. THE LAW
According to the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is "an unlawful
employment practice for an employer... to discriminate against any indi-
vidual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."" In 1986 the United States Supreme Court expanded
its interpretation of the statute's protections according to a regulation
promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC").' 2 The Court held, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, that
Title VII protects employees from having to work in "a discriminatorily
hostile or abusive work environment.' 1 3 For the past twenty years courts
have struggled to identify and adjudicate Title VII claims alleging hostile
work environments.
Eight years after it recognized a hostile work environment cause of
action, the Supreme Court provided guidance on how to handle such
claims in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.14 For a plaintiff to have an ac-
tionable hostile work environment claim, conduct in the workplace must
11. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 2006).
12. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)
(1985).
13. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66.
14. 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
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be objectively hostile such that a reasonable person would find the envi-
ronment hostile or abusive.' 5 The plaintiff must also subjectively believe
that the work environment is hostile or abusive. 16 Even if both of those
conditions are met, to violate Title VII the conduct must be "sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment
and create an abusive working environment."' 7
In determining whether a hostile work environment exists, lower courts
are instructed to consider relevant factors such as: "the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably
interferes with an employee's work performance." 18 Some courts refer to
this framework as the "totality of the circumstances" approach.' 9
Whether the conduct affected the plaintiff's psychological well-being is
another relevant factor that may be considered.20 The Court explicitly
stated that "merely offensive" conduct does not establish a hostile work
environment.21
One must wonder whether the Supreme Court realized that its holding
in Harris would be used to allow plaintiffs who experienced only isolated
and sometimes neutral remarks to present cumulative evidence detailing
how their co-workers were treated and how their co-workers perceived
the workplace. Requiring that conduct be "severe or pervasive" indicates
that the discriminatory conduct must be egregious or nearly constant, but
lower courts have not held to the Supreme Court's exacting standard. 22
The specified factors-frequency, severity, unreasonable interference,
and physical threat or humiliation-similarly seem to require a high level
of hostility or abuse.2 3 Again, despite the Supreme Court's framework,
lower courts have struggled to apply the factors consistently. The result is
a number of cases among the different circuits with widely varying and
often opposite results. The disparate holdings are frequently tied to the
breadth of discovery and admissibility of second-hand evidence involving
non-plaintiff third persons.
B. A TYPICAL CASE EXAMPLE
The myriad of defense successes and failures in hostile work environ-
ment claims are best understood through illustration. Wanchik v. Great
Lakes Health Plan, Inc. is a Sixth Circuit case that demonstrates some
common evidentiary problems. 24 The defendant employer's attempt to
15. Id. at 21.
16. Id. at 22.
17. Id. at 21 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67).
18. Id. at 23.
19. See, e.g., Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 659 (6th Cir. 1999).
20. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22.
21. Id. at 23.
22. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
23. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
24. Wanchik v. Great Lakes Health Plan, Inc., 6 F. App'x 252 (6th Cir. 2001).
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exclude evidence of incidents directed towards the plaintiff's co-workers
was partially successful.25 The female plaintiff, former Chief Executive
Officer ("CEO"), brought a Title VII hostile work environment claim
based on sexual harassment. 26 In an effort to survive the employer's mo-
tion for summary judgment, the plaintiff presented the affidavits of other
female employees detailing their experiences in the workplace. 27 While
some of the affidavits were signed, others were unsigned-purportedly
because the women worried their careers would be adversely affected. 28
The district court excluded the unsigned affidavits under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56(e). 29 It also excluded the signed affidavits relating to
events the plaintiff did not know about while she was employed by the
defendant. 30
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit upheld the exclusion of the unsigned affi-
davits.31 The defense's victory in excluding the second-hand evidence
was quickly cut short when the court found that the district court erred in
excluding some of the signed affidavits. 32 Even though the plaintiff was
unaware of the events involving the other women while she claimed to
have been subjected to a hostile work environment, the appeals court
found that a hostile work environment can be created when discrimina-
tory acts are directed at the plaintiff's class as a group, rather than the
plaintiff individually.33 Because the plaintiff had heard rumors that other
women had been harassed, she was not "unaware" of the events, despite
the fact that she did not know the details or have proof that the alleged
harassment had actually occurred. 34 The court acknowledged that the ex-
periences of the other women were "even more appalling and abusive
than those personally experienced by plaintiff. '35
The court stated, "Her awareness, however peripheral, of how her male
co-workers treated the entire protected class contributed to her percep-
tion of a hostile work environment. ' 36 Thus, summary judgment on the
sexually hostile work environment claim was improper because a material
issue of fact existed as to the pervasiveness of the improper conduct.37
The Wanchik court's statement was so broad as to include the plaintiff's
receiving even the most peripheral rumors as grounds for admitting sec-
25. Id. at 261.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 256.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 261.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. The opinion states: "[T]he District Court also ignored the properly executed
statements that corroborated plaintiff's description of Great Lakes as a vulgar and sexist
workplace ... because 'plaintiff admits she was unaware of these incidents of sexual har-
assment during her employment.' In this, the court erred as a matter of record." ld. (cita-
tion omitted).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 262.
35. Id. at 261.




ond-hand evidence. 38 For example, the plaintiff "knew there was some-
thing with Nancy Rich and Howard," and that knowledge was adequate
to make evidence of the incidents included in the rumors admissible. 39 In
fact, the number and frequency of the rumors the plaintiff heard lowered
the level of severity the plaintiff had to show accompanied the incidents
directed towards her personally. 40 Apparently, higher frequency equals
less severity in the Sixth Circuit.
The Sixth Circuit's opinion makes it seem as though the plaintiff suf-
fered severe discrimination herself, but that is not the case. When the
plaintiff was the CEO, the company was bought out.41 The incoming
President and CEO of the acquiring company advised the plaintiff that
she would retain her title but that he would be in charge, apparently be-
cause the plaintiff was struggling to relinquish her decision-making au-
thority.42 A male colleague in senior management told the plaintiff he
suspected the action was because the plaintiff "was not male and
Jewish." 43
The plaintiff claimed that from that point forward she was not included
in executive meetings, she was deprived of decision-making power, her
decisions were not implemented, and she was not allowed to make a
meaningful contribution to the company. 44 In other words, she was fro-
zen out of management. The plaintiff charged the defendant with main-
taining a "sexist and vulgar environment through inappropriate humor
and conduct. ' 45 The signed affidavits the Sixth Circuit found admissible
included claims by co-workers that two senior management members
made sexual statements and advances towards them.46 Meanwhile, the
only incidents of sexual discrimination the plaintiff claimed to have ex-
perienced herself were male members of upper management behaving
disrespectfully towards women generally by "telling lewd jokes, describ-
ing sexual fantasies, and denigrating women's bodies" in the plaintiff's
presence.47 One inappropriate comment was also made directly to the
plaintiff when she was chewing on her necklace.48 In its analysis the court
failed to determine the amount of time the plaintiff spent working with
the offending co-workers, how often she was required to engage with
them in the course of her job, or how isolated or frequent the jokes and
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 263 (quoting Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he
required showing of severity or seriousness of the harassing conduct varies inversely with
the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct.")).




45. Id. at 256.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 260-61.
48. Id. at 262. One man told her that chewing on her necklace caused him to think




The statements in the Wanchik case were unquestionably inappropriate
and sexually charged. But do they rise to the level of the severe or perva-
sive harassment envisioned by the Supreme Court in Meritor and Har-
ris?50 Is this the type of environment-one filled with sexist jokes,
comments, and rumors of inappropriate behavior-one that the employer
should have to pay for?51 Employers everywhere should be outraged
that summary judgment was not granted for the defendant on these facts.
The circuit court's evidentiary ruling created the possibility that on re-
mand the plaintiff could recover for the sexual advances made towards
her co-workers since the few stray comments the plaintiff heard herself
were nothing more than "mere offensive utterance[s]. ' '52 Most impor-
tantly, rumors should not be the basis for admitting evidence, as rumors
do not cause awareness. Once a company or an office reaches a certain
size, rumors of all sorts are bound to develop, whether based on truth or
on disgruntled employees' speculations about why co-workers have
reached their current status. Rumors together with a few stray comments
or jokes should not withstand summary judgment.
III. IS SECOND-HAND EVIDENCE EVEN RELEVANT?
A. THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
Basic knowledge of the Federal Rules of Evidence suggests that the
strongest argument against admitting second-hand evidence is that it is
simply irrelevant to whether the plaintiff, him or herself, was subjected to
a hostile work environment. A successful hostile work environment
claim, as outlined in Harris, requires that the alleged conduct be both
objectively and subjectively offensive. 53 Regardless of whether the plain-
tiff believes the environment is subjectively offensive, the objective re-
quirement indicates that the trier of fact should consider whether a
reasonable person having the same experiences as the plaintiff would
consider the work environment hostile or abusive.54 Seemingly clear is
that details of events not involving the plaintiff are irrelevant to this
49. See id.
50. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); see also Harris v Forklift
Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
51. Cf Burnett v. Tyco Corp., 203 F.3d 980, 981, 985 (6th Cir. 2000). In Burnett, the
plaintiff experienced three incidents of harassment directed towards her personally during
a six month period. Id. at 981. One incident amounted to a battery, in which the alleged
harasser placed a pack of cigarettes inside her tank top and brassiere strap. Id. The two
other incidents were categorized as "merely offensive remarks." Id. at 985. Once the al-
leged harasser handed plaintiff a cough drop and said, "Since you have lost your cherry,
here's one to replace the one you lost." Id. at 981. The other comment regarded a shirt
worn by plaintiff reading "Deck the Malls." The alleged harasser said to plaintiff, "Dick
the malls, dick the malls, I almost got aroused." Id. But, the Sixth Circuit still affirmed
summary judgment for the defendant on grounds that the incidents did not create an envi-
ronment sufficiently severe to constitute a hostile work environment. Id. at 985.
52. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.





Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states that relevant evidence
is evidence "having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence. '56 Rule 402 goes on to
deem all relevant evidence admissible.5 7 However, Rule 403 states, "Al-
though relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."'58 The require-
ment that one of the listed dangers or considerations must substantially
outweigh the probative value of the evidence makes it necessary for the
judge to perform a balancing test in determining whether to admit the
evidence.5 9
Because most courts find that events involving third persons have "any
tendency" to support the plaintiff's claim, evidence of discriminatory acts
directed towards people other than the plaintiff should most logically be
excluded under Rule 403.60 The danger of unfair prejudice to the defen-
dant-employer when third person evidence is admitted is considerable,
especially when the plaintiff attempts to present evidence of discrete, iso-
lated acts against several different individuals. 61 The jury may have diffi-
culty understanding why they are being asked to evaluate the context and
severity of what happened to someone other than the plaintiff. More im-
portantly, this evidence is confusing because the jury may not realize that
it must independently decide whether the incidents involving other em-
ployees actually happened at all. Also, quite possibly, if not probably, the
jury will hear how the plaintiff's co-workers feel that their work environ-
ment was altered by their experiences and forget that the plaintiff's work-
ing environment, and not his co-workers' working environment, is at
issue. Thus all three dangers enumerated in Rule 403 are present when
evidence of acts directed at third persons is admitted. 62 Depending on
the circumstances of the particular case, defense counsel may wish to ar-
gue that the three considerations outweigh the evidence's probative value
as well. 63
55. See, e.g., Stewart v. Houston Power & Lighting Co., 998 F. Supp. 746, 755 (S.D.
Tex. 1998) ("Several of the alleged incidents do not even involve [the plaintiff], but relate
to other women. These events do not meet the requirement that she personally was sub-
ject to unwelcome sexual harassment.").
56. FED. R. EVID. 401.
57. FED. R. EVID. 402.
58. FED. R. EvID. 403.
59. See id.
60. See id.; see also FED. R. EvID. 401.
61. See FED. R. EvID. 403.
62. See id. (unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury).
63. See id. (undue delay, waste of time, needless presentation of cumulative evidence).
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B. THE RULE 403 BALANCING AcT
The Seventh Circuit articulated how the Rule 403 balancing test func-
tions in Wyninger v. New Venture Gear, Inc., a case in which the plaintiff
brought a hostile work environment gender discrimination claim. 64 Wyn-
inger attempted to introduce evidence of another employee's earlier dis-
crimination claim against the employer, but the district court found the
evidence was inadmissible. 65 The Seventh Circuit, reviewing the trial
court's decision for abuse of discretion, found that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence because several dissimi-
larities between the plaintiff's and the witness's experiences existed.66
The other employee had worked in a different department from the
plaintiff and was subjected to a different employment decision that was
made by different supervisors. 67 In deciding to exclude the evidence, the
trial judge determined that the dangers of undue delay and confusion of
the issues substantially outweighed the probative value of the other em-
ployee's experience. 68 Wyninger indirectly points to an additional reason
so many district court admissions of co-worker evidence are not revers-
ible error on appeal: the appellate courts review the district courts' Rule
403 balancing analysis for abuse of discretion.69 To constitute reversible
error, the district court must have based its decision on an erroneous con-
clusion of law, or on facts that could not rationally lead to the district
court's decision.70 This high level of deference to the lower court's ruling
requires an egregious error, and appellate courts are often unwilling to
find that such an error occurred. 71
The Seventh Circuit's opinion specifically mentions one of the
problems with presenting second-hand evidence to the trier of fact-it
forces the parties to try a "case within a case."'72 Not only do jurors have
difficulty separating in their minds incidents that directly impacted the
plaintiff's work environment from second-hand incidents that may or may
not have had an effect, but jurors must also evaluate the evidence regard-
ing the second-hand incidents themselves. Jurors must decide (1)
whether they believe the event actually happened; (2) whether the details
of the event were accurately presented to them; (3) what information the
plaintiff knew about the event while he was allegedly subjected to a hos-
tile work environment; (4) what effect, if any, the information had on the
64. Wyninger v. New Venture Gear, Inc., 361 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 2004).
65. Id. at 975. The plaintiff's attempt was based upon a motion to consider newly
discovered evidence, but the circuit court's review of the district court's exclusion of the
evidence is based on the dissimilarity of the plaintiff's and the other employee's situations.
See id. That the evidence was offered late is treated as a bonus reason that the evidence




69. Id. at 974.
70. See, e.g., id.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 975.
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plaintiff's perception of his working environment; and (5) what effect, if
any, the information would have on a reasonable person's perception of
the working environment. While jurors probably realize that they must
consider the last two questions, unless the lawyers and the judge do a
thorough job of explaining it to them, most jurors probably do not realize
that they must also answer the first three questions.
Focusing on second-hand evidence also places a heavy burden on the
defense counsel. Not only must the defendant to be prepared to rebut
evidence about how the plaintiff was treated, but also evidence about in-
cidents involving third persons who do not have a direct stake in the case.
This adds volumes of discovery to pre-trial efforts, provides cause for
multiple motions and hearings, and unnecessarily lengthens and confuses
the trial itself. From the defendant's perspective, the practice of investi-
gating and presenting second-hand incidents causes the process to be an
inefficient waste of time and resources on matters that are only tangen-
tially related, if at all, to the plaintiff's claim. Because of the investment
necessary to defend against not only the plaintiff's, but also third persons'
experiences, employers may choose to settle the case. Thus, even without
a trial, the plaintiff has the opportunity to recover a windfall and be com-
pensated for incidents in which he was not even involved.
C. EXAMPLES OF PARTIALLY SUCCESSFUL IRRELEVANCE ARGUMENTS
While no court has categorically excluded second-hand evidence on
relevance grounds, some decisions provide examples of at least partially
successful 403 arguments by defendant-employers. Some cases are in-
cluded in this discussion for the quality of the trial courts' reasoning, even
though the appeals courts may have found error on review.
In a Seventh Circuit case in which the plaintiff claimed a racially hostile
work environment based on the conduct of his supervisor, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of racial com-
ments by the plaintiff's co-workers. 73 The evidence was confusing to the
jury, prejudicial, cumulative, and irrelevant to the plaintiff's claim that he
was harassed by his supervisor because his supervisor was not present
when the comments were made.74
While at first blush this decision seems like a coup for employers within
the Seventh Circuit, the holding is limited because the plaintiff was not
claiming co-worker harassment. 75 In a footnote the court indicates that if
the plaintiff had claimed a hostile work environment based on harass-
ment by his co-workers, rather than his supervisor, then "the pervasive-
ness of coworker conduct could show the employer's constructive notice
of the harassment (presumably even if the plaintiff is not present). '76
Further, when the claim is based on both co-worker and supervisor con-
73. Mason v. S. Ill. Univ. at Carbondale, 233 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2000).
74. Id. at 1042.
75. Id. at 1044-45.
76. Id. at 1046 n.8.
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duct, then "all instances of harassment by all parties are relevant to prov-
ing that his environment is sufficiently severe or pervasive. ' 77 The
appeals court made clear that for third-person incidents of racism to be
relevant to the plaintiff's hostile work environment claim the plaintiff
must have known about the incidents while he was employed.78 Lan-
guage near the end of the opinion indicates that if the plaintiff had known
of the comments by co-workers while he was employed, and if the co-
workers had made comments in the presence of the plaintiff's supervisor,
then the comments would have been relevant to show the supervisor's
motives in allowing a racially hostile environment. 79
In Jackson v. Quanex, a Sixth Circuit racially hostile work environment
case, the circuit court found that the trial court erred in granting judg-
ment as a matter of law for the defendant. 80 The district court excluded
evidence offered by the plaintiff about racial incidents that were not di-
rected at the plaintiff and that occurred outside the plaintiff's presence. 81
The trial judge found that the evidence was irrelevant to the plaintiff's
hostile work environment claim. 82
In finding error, the appellate court quoted the Supreme Court's state-
ment in Meritor that employees should be protected from "working envi-
ronments so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely
the emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers. '83
The opinion then quoted the Second Circuit: "[T]he fact that a plaintiff
learns second-hand of a racially derogatory comment or joke by a fellow
employee or supervisor can impact the work environment. ' 84 The Sixth
Circuit further found that the district court adopted too narrow a view of
hostile work environment claims, requiring that every member of the pro-
tected class experience personal and racial singling out before a plaintiff
could sue for a racially hostile work environment. 85
Despite the trial court's misstatement of the facts required to prove a
prima facie case sufficient to withstand a motion for judgment as a matter
of law, the district court's evidentiary ruling disallowing the plaintiff's at-
tempt to introduce evidence of racial incidents involving co-workers has
merit. At the end of the plaintiff's presentation of her case, in ruling on
the defendant's motion, the district court found that allowing additional
African-American employees from the plant to testify would be cumula-
tive presentation of evidence in light of testimony that had already been
heard.86 The district court judge stated, on the record:
77. Id. at 1045 (citing the totality of circumstances approach endorsed by the Supreme
Court in Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).
78. Id. at 1046; see also Burnett v. Tyco Corp., 203 F.3d 980, 981 (6th Cir. 2000).
79. Mason, 233 F.3d at 1047.
80. Jackson v. Quanex, 191 F.3d 647, 659 (6th Cir. 1999).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 659, 661.
83. Id. at 660 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986)).
84. Id. at 661 (quoting Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1997)).
85. Id. at 659-60.
86. Id. at 656; see also FED. R. EvID. 403.
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As I understand what you are telling me, the testimony of Critton
[sic], Macomb [sic], Copeland, Fouts, would be cumulative or along
the same lines of the testimony of Darlene Solomon .... That is not
setting the tone of the work environment. You can't strain [sic], in
my view, a series of isolated incidences, discrete incidences and dots
and build a case of hostile environment.... And the fact that there is
a subjective feeling by any minority group in a plant, that is an un-
happy place to work in and are mistreated, standing by itself is irrele-
vant to this.87
This ruling does not seem unreasonable or unduly narrow. Instead, it
asserts that the case centers on the plaintiffs work environment and
whether the plaintiff should recover from the defendant for the work en-
vironment she experienced. The Sixth Circuit disagreed, concluding that
incidents must be aggregated to assess the cumulative effect of all of the
incidents taken together in order to adhere to the Supreme Court's "to-
tality of the circumstances" approach.88
In practice, the Sixth Circuit's methodology is detrimental to the case
of any employer defending a hostile work environment claim. True, the
racially charged incidents in Jackson were serious-they included graffiti,
vandalism, threats, and alteration of machines to create safety hazards.89
However, the court's broad statements provide authority for future
courts to allow small bits of information regarding isolated incidents to be
admitted into evidence and somehow be glued together to create a hostile
work environment. This decision creates a danger that in future cases
isolated and minor incidents will be accumulated to create the
"equivalent of" a single severe incident where the workplace hostility is
much less severe than the incidents in Jackson.90 The district court's eval-
uation of the record simply makes more logical sense. 91
In a third case, from a district court in the Ninth Circuit, a female,
African-American former sheriff's deputy alleged a race- and gender-
based hostile work environment.92 In its opinion denying the defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment, the California district court stated:
Evidence of conduct which was directed at plaintiff, occurred in her
presence, or affected conditions in her workplace is relevant to a
continuing violation of plaintiff's right to be free of an abusive work
environment. Plaintiff's evidence regarding racism and sexism in the
department generally, such as testimony by former employees about
racist jokes they heard and racist events that took place in areas
where plaintiff was not assigned, are not relevant to this inquiry, al-
though such evidence is relevant to the issue of the employer's
knowledge and duty to correct.93
87. Jackson, 191 F.3d at 656.
88. Id. at 660.
89. See id. at 652-57.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 656.
92. Anthony v. County of Sacramento, 898 F. Supp. 1435, 1440 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
93. Id. at 1446 n.15.
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While this ruling appears to be helpful to defendants trying to exclude
second-hand evidence, its significance was reduced later in the opinion
when evidence regarding racist graffiti in the men's locker room was ad-
mitted. 94 Because the plaintiff was a member of the Black Deputy Sher-
iff's Association (the organization targeted by the graffiti), and because
employees talked about the graffiti, evidence about the graffiti was ad-
missible. 95 Evidence regarding the way African-American inmates were
treated was also permitted because on at least one occasion it caused the
plaintiff's job to be more difficult than it would have been otherwise. 96
Employers can craft several arguments against admitting second-hand
evidence based on the reasoning in these cases. When the plaintiff al-
leges harassment by a supervisor, employers should argue that harass-
ment by co-workers should not be admitted to prove the plaintiff's work
environment was hostile.97 From the Anthony opinion, defendants can
argue that evidence about the general work atmosphere or about events
that occurred outside the plaintiff's work area are not relevant to the hos-
tility of the plaintiff's work environment. 98 Even if these specific rele-
vance arguments do not help the defendant's case, employers should
always argue that second-hand evidence is irrelevant to the plaintiff's
claim and that it is unfairly prejudicial.
D. RELEVANT TO WHAT?
Some courts are willing to go to great lengths in order to admit second-
hand evidence. Such evidence is routinely admitted on the grounds that
it is relevant to either a peripheral issue in the case or a question related
only to liability or damages.
A district court in the Eighth Circuit stated that evidence of harass-
ment and discrimination towards employees other than the plaintiff is rel-
evant to the issues of (1) whether the employer maintained a hostile work
environment; (2) whether the employer intended to harass and discrimi-
nate against the plaintiff's class; and (3) whether the employer's reasons
for refusing to discipline the alleged harasser/discriminator were pretex-
tual. 99 All three of these issues go to employer liability, not to whether
the plaintiff's work environment was actually hostile.
Another case from the Eighth Circuit, Williams v. ConAgra Poultry
Co., involved a racially hostile work environment claim brought by a for-
94. Id. at 1448 n.20.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1448-49. Evidence was presented that excessive force was used against Afri-
can-American inmates and that at least one white employee bragged about his use of phys-
ical violence against African-American inmates. Id. at 1441. The plaintiff was also sent in
alone to subdue an African-American inmate who had been provoked, apparently into a
dangerous rage, by racist comments. Id.
97. See, e.g., Mason v. S. Ill. Univ. at Carbondale, 233 F.3d 1036, 1041-42 (7th Cir.
2000).
98. Anthony, 898 F. Supp. at 1446 n.15.
99. Weyers v. Lear Operations Corp., 232 F. Supp. 2d 977, 997 (W.D. Mo. 2002), rev'd
on other grounds, 359 F.3d 1049 (8th Cir. 2004).
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mer employee, an African-American male.'00 Ruling on a motion in
limine, the trial court excluded evidence of a previous employee's suc-
cessful verdict against the employer, but did not decide whether to allow
testimony regarding the events underlying the previous suit. l0 ' At trial,
the plaintiff's witnesses were permitted to testify about the incidents in-
volving the plaintiff and also about the events that gave rise to the earlier
case.102 Female African-American employees testified about their indi-
vidual experiences, such as being physically "manhandled" by a supervi-
sor and being treated poorly for not responding to white supervisors'
sexual advances.10 3
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit found that the women's testimony was
irrelevant to whether the plaintiff's environment was subjectively hostile
because he was not aware of the events while he was employed. 10 4 The
court refused to find error on the grounds that the other witnesses' testi-
mony made the plaintiff's testimony about his working environment more
credible.10 5 It was also deemed probative as to management's motives in
firing the plaintiff. 106 The court stated, "Evidence of widespread tolera-
tion of racial harassment and disparate treatment condoned by manage-
ment was relevant to its motive in firing [plaintiff]."'01 7 The testimony
was held relevant on the issue of whether the plaintiff was eligible for
punitive damages on his harassment claim as well.10 8 These peripheral
issues of employer motive and whether punitive damages should be
awarded are separate from the main issue-whether the plaintiff's work
environment was so severe or pervasive that it altered his working
conditions.109
One district court within the Tenth Circuit held that slurs directed at
third persons are relevant as evidence of the general work atmosphere,
and are thus admissible in the plaintiff's hostile work environment
claim.110 This result had been earlier endorsed by the circuit itself: "A
finding of pervasiveness or severity need not rest solely on actions aimed
directly at plaintiff, however, but may also consider harassment of others
in the workplace." '' The circuit court decision involved evidence about
how a doctor treated Latino, African-American, and female patients
poorly in comparison to Caucasian and male patients, and its relevance to
a hostile work environment claim by the doctor's minority employees. 1 2
100. Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790, 792 (8th Cir. 2004).
101. Id. at 793.
102. Id.
103. Id.





109. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
110. Watson v. City of Topeka, 241 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1232 (D. Kan. 2002).
111. Nieto v. Kapoor, 268 F.3d 1208, 1219 n.7 (10th Cir. 2001). This case was based on
a § 1983 claim because the defendant was a doctor at a public hospital.
112. Id. at 1214.
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Thus, evidence of how the doctor treated patients was admitted in a suit
brought by his employee. 113
In another case, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment for the defendant-employer on the grounds that when
a plaintiff seeks to hold the employer liable for harassment by a co-
worker, as opposed to a supervisor, the plaintiff's case should survive
summary judgment if there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the employer knew or should have known about the alleged har-
asser's inappropriate behavior.114 Incidents of sexual harassment by the
same employee who allegedly harassed the plaintiff that were "similar in
nature and near in time to his harassment of [the plaintiff]" should have
been admitted for the purpose of proving the employer had notice that
the work environment was hostile. 11 5
These few cases admitted second-hand evidence to show employer in-
tent, possible pretext for an employment decision, credibility of the plain-
tiff's testimony, availability of punitive damages, the general work
atmosphere, or employer notice of the harassing activity. Aside from
possibly the amorphous general work atmosphere concept, all of these
issues are severable from the central issue: whether the work environ-
ment actually experienced by the plaintiff was hostile. The simplest way
to avoid unfair prejudice to the defendant, confusion of the issues, and
waste of time that results when evidence about these peripheral issues is
introduced at trial is to bifurcate hostile work environment cases. First,
evidence should be presented about only those incidents that involved
the plaintiff directly. Then, the jury should determine whether or not that
evidence proves that the plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work environ-
ment. Only if the jury answers this first question in the affirmative should
second-hand evidence have a chance to be admitted on the subsequent
issues, such as motive, employer knowledge, and employer liability. This
structure would help the jury more clearly understand the evidence re-
lated to the plaintiff, and it would limit the use of second-hand evidence
to the peripheral issues for which it is admitted.
IV. COURT-IMPOSED PREREQUISITES TO ADMISSION OF
SECOND-HAND EVIDENCE
Several courts have created their own approaches to determining
whether to admit second-hand evidence in hostile work environment
cases. These methods provide basic guidelines for use within the Federal
Rules of Evidence framework regarding relevance and probative value.
While a more strict application of the Federal Rules themselves would be
best, these attempts to restrict second-hand evidence are commendable.
The most common requirements are that third-person victims be mem-
bers of the plaintiff's same protected class, that the plaintiff have been
113. Id. at 1219.




aware of third-person incidents during the time he alleges he was sub-
jected to a hostile work environment, or both. A section about the Third
Circuit, which does not require plaintiff awareness during employment, is
also included.
A. LIMITS BASED ON THE PROTECTED CLASS OF THE THIRD PERSONS
In Melton v. Five Four, Corp., a white male employee brought a Title
VII hostile work environment suit claiming that the defendant-employer
discriminated against minorities. 116 The plaintiff claimed that the bar and
restaurant at which he worked routinely limited the number of minority
customers admitted under the pretext that many would-be minority cus-
tomers did not meet dress code requirements. 117 Meanwhile, white cus-
tomers were allowed to enter when wearing similar clothing.11 8 Although
the plaintiff complained about the discriminatory admittance policy and
posited that implementing the policy was a condition of his employment
that made his working environment hostile, summary judgment was
granted for the defendants.119 The white plaintiff was not a member of
the minorities' protected classes, and thus could not introduce evidence
that they were discriminated against.
A similar holding was reached by the Fourth Circuit in Childress v. City
of Richmond. °20 In Childress, a group of white male police officers
claimed that their supervisor created a hostile work environment by mak-
ing discriminatory remarks about women and about African-American
officers. 12' The plaintiffs claimed that their supervisor's comments dis-
rupted their working environment and caused tension in their relation-
ships within the police force.122 The district court dismissed the case for
lack of standing and was affirmed on appeal.123 The white males were
not permitted to sue for the supervisor's hostility towards women and
minorities.
These two cases demonstrate a requirement that may seem inherent in
the hostile work environment scheme but that is not often discussed in
courts' opinions: second-hand evidence must involve discrimination
against third persons who are members of the same protected class as the
plaintiff. Because the plaintiffs were both white males, they were each
prohibited from introducing evidence that people in different race and
gender classes were discriminated against. A district court in the Second
Circuit has provided the most clear statement of this requirement: "[Tihe
other employees targeted must be in the same protected class as the
116. Melton v. Five Four, Corp., No. 99 C 1274, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 638, at *2 (N.D.
Il1. Jan. 25, 2000).
117. Id.
118. Id. at *5.
119. Id. at *18-24.
120. 134 F.3d 1205, 1207 (4th Cir. 1998).
121. Id. at 1206-07.




plaintiff for the hostile work environment claim to withstand a motion to
dismiss.112 4
B. PLAINTIFF'S AWARENESS OF THE INCIDENTS INVOLVING THIRD
PERSONS WHILE WORKING IN THE ALLEGEDLY HOSTILE
WORK ENVIRONMENT
If a person does not know about something, then that something does
not affect the person's perception of his environment. This should seem
self-evident, however, much has been written by courts considering evi-
dence of incidents not involving the plaintiff about whether the plaintiff
must have known about the incidents for them to have affected her work
environment. At least one circuit allows the evidence to be presented
and then requires the trier of fact to determine whether the plaintiff was
aware of the incidents. Another circuit does not require plaintiff aware-
ness at all.
1. Awareness Required
In Hirase-Doi v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., the Tenth Circuit re-
fused to admit evidence that a plaintiff's co-workers were harassed be-
cause the plaintiff was not aware of the conduct "during the time that she
was allegedly subject to a hostile work environment. '125 Citing the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Harris, requiring the work en-
vironment be both objectively and subjectively hostile, the circuit court
found that the subjective requirement means that the plaintiff must have
been aware of any other incidents of harassment for them to have con-
tributed to the plaintiff's subjective perception of a hostile work environ-
ment.12 6 The Tenth Circuit also found that the plaintiff may rely on
evidence about incidents she was aware of to show that it affected her
"general work atmosphere. ' 127
The magistrate judge in Moore v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dis-
trict, discussed below, denied a motion in limine to exclude evidence in a
gender-based harassment and hostile work environment claim that one of
the plaintiff's co-workers had been sexually harassed.12 8 Although the
co-worker only experienced one incident of harassment, the court found
that the incident was relevant to the plaintiff's hostile work environment
claim so long as the plaintiff knew about the incident "at or around the
time the harassment occurred. '129 The opinion indicates that both the
124. Smith v. AVSC Int'l, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 302, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Cf. Cruz v.
Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 572 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that incidents of gender and
race discrimination could each exacerbate the effect of the other).
125. Hirase-Doi v. U.S. W. Commc'ns, Inc., 61 F.3d 777, 782 (10th Cir. 1995).
126. Id. See also Stewart v. Houston Power & Lighting Co., 998 F. Supp. 746, 755 (S.D.
Tex. 1998).
127. Hirase-Doi, 61 F.3d at 782.
128. Moore v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist., No. 02 C 4040, 2004 WL 2958769, at *7-




plaintiff's awareness of the incident and the timing of the incident bear on
the weight of the evidence. 130 Although the opinion states that the pro-
bative value of the incident is not substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, the judge declined to make a final determination on
the evidence's admissibility until trial.' 3 '
2. Awareness Required But Is Determined by Trier of Fact-Second
Circuit
The Second Circuit allows some evidence of incidents that happened
outside the plaintiff's presence and that were not directed at the plaintiff,
but requires the plaintiff have been aware of those incidents during the
time his or her work environment was allegedly hostile. 132 In Schwapp v.
Town of Avon, a racially hostile work environment claim, the Second Cir-
cuit reversed summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the grounds
that second-hand knowledge of a racist comment can affect the work en-
vironment of a member of the protected class discriminated against by
the comment.1 33
The circuit court also found that the district court erred in refusing to
consider evidence of specific instances of racially discriminatory conduct
that related to other minority groups and that happened before the plain-
tiff began working for the defendant employer.134 Evidence of these
events should have been considered at the summary judgment stage, al-
though the court noted that they "may be of limited probative value."'1 35
The Second Circuit further stated that whether the plaintiff was aware of
the incidents, whether awareness of those incidents caused the plaintiff to
subjectively perceive conduct directed at him as making his work envi-
ronment hostile or abusive, and whether such awareness would cause a
reasonable person to perceive his work environment as hostile or abusive
were questions that should be relegated to the trier of fact.136
The Second Circuit's holding is problematic. Should awareness and its
effect on both the subjective and objective perception of the plaintiff's
work environment as hostile or abusive be left to the trier of fact? In jury
cases, any information about incidents the plaintiff learned of second-
hand will likely affect the jury's overall evaluation of the workplace. A
limiting instruction seems inadequate to keep the jury from considering
evidence that other people were harassed or discriminated against while
making its determination on whether the work environment was in fact
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1997).
133. See id. at 111.
134. Id. at 112. Unlike courts in the previous section, the Second Circuit allows second-





hostile to the plaintiff.137 Any incidents involving the plaintiff become
less isolated, both by definition and in terms of general human percep-
tion, when additional occurrences are presented.
Allowing the jury to decide whether or not the plaintiff was aware of
other incidents unnecessarily exposes the jury to evidence that is highly
prejudicial to the defendant. While the jury could easily find that a few
unrelated incidents are not pervasive or severe enough to create a hostile
work environment, the jury would have much more difficulty finding for
the defendant when faced with minor incidents directed at the plaintiff
plus a series of several incidents directed at other people in the work-
place. From a quantitative standpoint, the more incidents presented, the
more likely a hostile work environment existed. Qualitatively, the courts
appear unconcerned with prohibiting evidence of incidents substantially
more egregious than those the plaintiff experienced. 138 Thus, one off-
hand comment to the plaintiff plus one very severe incident, for example
a noose hanging at a co-worker's workstation, may constitute a hostile
work environment claim for the plaintiff. Should not the worker in
whose workspace the noose was hung recover from the employer, as op-
posed to the plaintiff, who experienced one derogatory remark?
3. Awareness Not Required-Third Circuit
The Third Circuit has done away with even the minimal awareness
threshold for the admittance of second-hand evidence. 139 In Hurley v.
Atlantic City Police Department, a Title VII gender-based discrimination
and hostile work environment case, the Third Circuit found that the dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of four
women about harassment in the department that the plaintiff did not wit-
ness and that the plaintiff did not even become aware of until after filing
the lawsuit.140 What is more, eight male officers were permitted to testify
regarding comments co-workers made about women and derogatory
terms used to describe women behind their backs. 141 These statements
were made outside the plaintiff's presence, the plaintiff was unaware of
them until after filing suit, and they were made when there were no wo-
men present at all.142 Still more damaging to the defendant's case, the
court also admitted evidence about incidents of harassment beyond the
statute of limitations, as far back as nine years before the statutory
period. 143
137. See, e.g., Nash v. U.S., 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932) (explaining that the limit-
ing instruction is a "recommendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is beyond,
not only their powers, but anybody's else").
138. See Jackson v. Quanex, 191 F.3d 647, 652-57 (6th Cir. 1999).
139. See Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep't, 174 F.3d 95, 107-10 (3d Cir. 1999).
140. Id. at 108.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep't, 933 F. Supp. 396, 410 (D.N.J. 1996).
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At trial, the district court stated that the evidence was admitted prima-
rily because "it was crucial to the jury's evaluation of the work environ-
ment at the ACPD.' 44 The court stated that some evidence was
admitted for the purpose of proving liability, whereas other evidence was
admitted for the limited purpose of helping the jury understand the liabil-
ity evidence. 145 All three types of evidence (other women's experiences,
the general attitude of male officers towards women, and events outside
the statute of limitations period) served several purposes according to the
district court:
[The evidence] allowed the jury to gain insight into the motives, atti-
tudes, and intentions of the defendants. It gave them the opportunity
to evaluate the adequacy of management's response to Hurley's
complaints during the statutory period. It provided the jury with a
sense of whether the events that took place during the statutory pe-
riod were anomalous or accidental, or instead were part of a "perva-
sive and severe" pattern. 146
According to the district court, disallowing the evidence would have lim-
ited the jury to seeing only a piece of the plaintiff's experience at the
department, and in its view the jury needed to hear the whole story to be
able to put the liability evidence into perspective. 147 The district court
believed that admitting the evidence and providing a limiting instruction
to the jury regarding what evidence could be used as a basis for liability
adequately balanced the parties' competing interests. 148
In addressing its balancing of the second-hand evidence's probative
value against the risk of unfair prejudice, the district court found that the
risk did not substantially outweigh the probative value, and that any
prejudice was corrected by the limiting instruction and the context of the
case.149 Further, the district court opined that the humiliation the plain-
tiff was subjected to, as shown by the evidence of sexual harassment di-
rected at her individually, was so severe that the prejudice was
"insignificant." 50
The trial court stated that evidence that other women were harassed
showed that the conduct towards the plaintiff was not isolated and that
the plaintiff's experience was not unique.151 This rationale is puzzling in
two respects. First, the plaintiff's situation was most definitely unique.
She was the first female sergeant in the department.1 52 The district court
recognized this fact, yet it bore little importance on the court's analysis of
the evidence. a53 The experiences of one other female police officer, a
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 411.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 413.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 411.
152. Id. at 405.
153. See id. at 401
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prosecutor, and two payroll employees regarding incidents of gender har-
assment can scarcely be called comparable to the plaintiff-sergeant's
treatment in her position as the first female supervising officer. 154 More
importantly, the plaintiff did not know of the incidents involving the four
other women until after she filed suit, negating the possibility that those
incidents contributed to her working environment. 155  Second, why
should it matter whether the jury believes that the plaintiff's complaint
was not unique? The plaintiff is the only woman who filed suit and the
only woman to be compensated should the jury find against the
defendant.
On appeal, the Third Circuit failed to recognize these faults in af-
firming the lower court, finding the harassment of other women relevant
because it could show that the plaintiff's working conditions were al-
tered.156 Incidents that plaintiff did not know about, whether in the form
of specific acts of harassment or a general sexist attitude, were admissible
because they were probative on the issue of whether the employer's
stated reasons for its employment actions were merely pretext.157 The
evidence was also probative on the issues of whether the employer knew
or should have known that its anti-harassment policy was unheeded, and
whether the harassment was in fact sexually discriminatory.1 58 The plain-
tiff's knowledge was unnecessary because the evidence showed motive
and aided the jury in its determination of employer liability. 159 And
while the circuit court found that the district court erred in admitting evi-
dence about incidents that occurred six to nine years beyond the statute
of limitations period, the error was determined harmless.1 60
The Third Circuit allows the most widespread evidence, both in terms
of the type of second-hand evidence (other employees who were
harassed, testimony about locker room conversations not made in the
presence of any member of the plaintiff's protected class) and in terms of
the value assigned to the evidence. By not requiring the plaintiff to even
have knowledge about other incidents during his or her period of employ-
("As women increasingly enter workplaces historically reserved for men,
particularly those which value traditionally 'male' virtues such as physical
strength and courage, it is not surprising that some male employees will by
word or deed display their displeasure at this female 'intrusion.' An em-
ployer cannot sit back and adopt a 'boys will be boys' attitude when this
happens; it must move promptly and forcibly to make it clear to the entire
workforce that conduct which demeans women or makes them feel unwel-
come will not be tolerated.")
154. See id. at 410.
155. See id.
156. Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep't, 174 F.3d 75, 110 (3d Cir. 1999).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 111.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 112. The determination that the error was harmless seems at odds with the
general attitude of the court's opinion that every little bit helps the jury more fully under-
stand the liability-provoking incidents. The plaintiff's case was permitted to be built brick
by brick, including these remote incidents at the foundation. As such, the jury's interpreta-
tion of later events could have been tainted by hearing of the earlier conduct.
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ment, the Third Circuit allows an attenuated chain of inferences to lead to
the conclusion that a hostile work environment existed based on separate,
isolated incidents considered together as whole. In allowing this wide
breadth of evidence, the focus is on punishing the employer, as opposed
to compensating the victim. Yet in the process of punishing the em-
ployer, one victim is allowed to recover a windfall.
The Hurley decision also represents another of the more practical
problems with admitting second-hand evidence: the plaintiff is not re-
quired to join the victims of the other incidents as co-plaintiffs. In es-
sence, the plaintiff has the good fortune of not being the only employee
to have experienced unpleasant behavior and is allowed to use the other
victims to bolster his or her own claim. One co-worker does not have
standing to sue on behalf of another, but these cases result in giving single
plaintiffs the chance to indirectly reap monetary awards based on others'
humiliation or discomfort.
V. INFREQUENTLY USED EVIDENCE RULES
Some evidentiary objections can only be made in certain circum-
stances. When the alleged harasser is included as a defendant in addition
to the employer, he or she can argue that past conduct is inadmissible
character evidence. In other cases, depending on the source and path of
the rumor mill, defendants may be able to object that witnesses lack per-
sonal knowledge about the second-hand events.
A. INADMISSIBLE CHARACTER EVIDENCE 1 6 1
In one early gender-based hostile work environment claim, while ruling
on the defendant's motion for new trial (by both the defendant-employer
and the defendant-individual alleged harasser) following a jury verdict in
favor of the plaintiff, the trial court refused the argument that "prior bad
acts" towards former and present employees should not have been admit-
ted into evidence.162 The trial court had admitted evidence of two prior
claims against the alleged harasser (but not the details of the incidents
leading to the claims) that happened seven and ten years earlier, and the
plaintiff was also permitted to read into evidence a stipulation regarding a
third claim against the alleged harasser. 163 The trial court also admitted
evidence regarding the individual defendant's alleged harassment of
three other women. 164 Both the defendants argued that the evidence
should have been excluded because the two prior claims were remote in
time, because the prior incidents were not similar in nature to the conduct
the plaintiff complained about, and because of the danger of unfair
prejudice.' 65 The defendants' arguments centered around Federal Rules
161. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
162. Webb v. Hyman, 861 F. Supp. 1094, 1109 (D.D.C. 1994).





of Evidence 403 and 404(b). 166
Regarding the defendants' 403 arguments, the trial court found that
testimony by three women who had been harassed "within the past few
years" was relevant and also highly probative.' 67 The court noted the
difficulty in showing that the employer had discriminatory intent, and
that other incidents of harassment help to show both intent and the exis-
tence of a hostile work environment.168 On the point of liability, the evi-
dence was relevant to whether the employer had notice of the work
environment's hostility under the plaintiff's supervisor, and also on the
issue of whether the employer took prompt and appropriate remedial
measures. 169 The court found two of the women were treated similarly to
the plaintiff, and the third woman was allowed to testify that attractive
women generally received preferential treatment in the workplace. 170
The district court found that the defendants did not present adequate
case law to support their argument that the evidence should have been
excluded as inadmissible character evidence. 171 Addressing the em-
ployer's attempt to analogize to a criminal case in which a new trial was
granted after evidence of an arrest two and a half years earlier was admit-
ted, the court found that the prejudice of a prior arrest was "qualitatively
greater than any risk of prejudice from an EEOC complaint.' 172 The
court believed that its limiting instruction sufficiently minimized any dan-
ger of unfair prejudice. 173 Also, the defendants in Webb were given and
took advantage of the opportunity to present rebuttal witnesses. 174
This failed attempt to exclude "prior bad acts" was only a decision by
one district court. Another court might exclude the prior complaints
under Rule 404(b). For example, in a case where the alleged harasser was
recently hired, the defendant-employer might succeed in excluding the
evidence because incidents not occurring at the present workplace could
not have provided notice to the employer, and could not show the em-
ployer's intent. Or, the employer could try to sever the claim against the
alleged harasser.
166. Id. See FED. R. EvID. 403, 404(b). Rule 404(b) states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the char-
acter of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportu-
nity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a
criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trail, or during
trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general
nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
167. Webb, 861 F. Supp. at 1111.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1109.
170. Id. at 1111.
171. Id. at 1110.
172. Id.




B. LACK OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 1 7 5
Discussed above, in Schwapp v. Town of Avon, the Second Circuit re-
quired the plaintiff to have been aware of second-hand incidents while he
was allegedly subjected to a hostile work environment. 176 While the
court allowed evidence of second-hand incidents that the plaintiff knew
about, some statements regarding those incidents were excluded because
the witnesses did not have personal knowledge. 177 Portions of the affida-
vits of two witnesses for the plaintiff that made only conclusory state-
ments regarding race discrimination and a racially hostile work
environment were properly excluded. 178 The witnesses' statements were
inadmissible because the witnesses did not have personal knowledge of
any specific instances of racially discriminatory incidents. 179
In another case, regarding a female firefighter's claim that co-workers
told her that another firefighter disparaged her behind her back, the Sec-
ond Circuit stated, "[Alssertions made by [plaintiff] only on information
and belief, for example, would not be admissible through her at trial, for
testimony as to facts must generally be based on the witness's personal
knowledge."180
Based on these decisions defendants may be able to limit testimony
about second-hand evidence to events the witnesses actually perceived
first-hand. Thus, the plaintiff would not be able to testify about the de-
tails of events he did perceive in person. By strictly limiting the testi-
mony of all witnesses to events they have personal knowledge about, the
plaintiff would be required to locate and depose witnesses who were pre-
sent when the events occurred-the middlemen in the rumor chain.
VI. HEARSAY ARGUMENTS
When a hostile work environment plaintiff claims she learned about
other incidents of harassment from third persons, one of the evidentiary
hurdles that quickly comes to mind is hearsay. Particularly when the
plaintiff herself testifies about what she heard, a defense objection may
be sustained because second-hand statements are inadmissible to prove
the truth of the matter asserted in the statements. 181
Some courts have admitted these second-hand statements under an ex-
ception to the hearsay rule that the statements are not offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted, but to show the statements' effect on the
listener-here, the plaintiff.182 These rulings are troubling because, by
allowing the statements into evidence for this limited purpose, the courts
175. See FED. R. EVID. 602.
176. See Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 148 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1997).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. See also FED. R. EVID. 602.
180. Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 155 (2d Cir. 2000).
181. See FED. R. EVID. 801, 802.
182. See FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee's note, subdiv. C.
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are not requiring sufficient evidence that the events actually happened.
While false rumors may have made the plaintiff's work environment sub-
jectively hostile, falsities cannot be the basis for finding objective hostility
or abuse.
A. POTENTIALLY SUCCESSFUL HEARSAY ARGUMENTS
In Gordon v. Southern Bells, Inc., the plaintiff claimed gender discrimi-
nation and a hostile work environment. 183 The district court denied the
defendant's motion for summary judgment on the hostile work environ-
ment claim.' 84 In doing so, the court addressed the admissibility of the
plaintiff's statements that she heard rumors regarding the company's vice
president and co-owner to the effect that he was having an affair with
someone from the office. 185 The vice president and co-owner implicated
by the rumor was one of the men who allegedly harassed the plaintiff. 86
The court ruled that the plaintiff's testimony about the rumors was
inadmissible hearsay that would not be considered on summary judg-
ment, nor at trial. 187 But the court was careful to point out that had the
plaintiff deposed witnesses and obtained affidavits supporting the sub-
stance of the rumors, then the evidence would have come in.188 The
Gordon court also excluded as inadmissible hearsay testimony by a wit-
ness for the defendant that some of the plaintiff's co-workers said there
had been no improper conduct.189
In support of its exclusion of the hearsay-based testimony, the district
court cited to a 1999 Seventh Circuit opinion, Minor v. Ivy Tech State
College.190 In Minor, the Seventh Circuit excluded testimony in the
plaintiff's deposition that she had heard rumors in the workplace that her
alleged harasser had engaged in sexual relationships with other employ-
ees.191 The court went on to include guidance to the district courts con-
cerning this type of evidence: "Courts must be particularly assiduous to
enforce the hearsay rule in sexual harassment cases in order to protect
the privacy both of alleged victims and alleged harassers against scurri-
lous rumors (designed to coerce either settlement or abandonment of the
suit) regarding their sex lives."' 192 While this limitation is tailored to ru-
mors about sexual harassers, it could be extended to all hostile work envi-
ronment claims.
183. Gordon v. S. Bells, Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 966, 969 (S.D. Ind. 1999).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 978.
186. Id. at 970.
187. See id. at 978.
188. Id. This is another example of how important the middleman can be to the plain-
tiff's case. Only if the middleman testifies can the second-hand evidence come in. See
infra notes 194-200 and accompanying text.
189. Gordon, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 978.
190. Id. (citing Minor v. Ivy Tech State Coll., 174 F.3d 855, 856 (7th Cir. 1999)).




Another successful hearsay argument occurred in a case in which an
employee who managed the academic fellowship program at Columbia
University brought a gender and age discrimination hostile work environ-
ment suit against the university. 193 The plaintiff attempted to introduce
into evidence responses to an anonymous survey completed by prior fel-
lows. 194 The Second Circuit held the surveys were inadmissible
hearsay.195
In a later Second Circuit case, Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties,
Inc., the plaintiff alleged a racially hostile work environment under 42
U.S.C. § 1981, rather than under Title VII. 19 6 The district court found
that alleged incidents of harassment that did not occur in the plaintiff's
presence were not probative on the issue of whether the plaintiff exper-
ienced a hostile work environment. 197 The court cited Schwapp v. Town
of Avon for the proposition that second-hand evidence is less probative
than comments and events that the plaintiff perceived first-hand. 198 On
appeal, the Second Circuit wrote that the district court missed the main
point of Schwapp-that a determination on probative value should not be
made when ruling on a motion for summary judgment.199 Of more inter-
est, the Second Circuit stated, "[I]t is possible that the statements re-
ported to the plaintiff and not supported by affidavits are inadmissible
hearsay. '200 While not conclusive, this statement lends support to de-
fendants' hearsay arguments.
In still another Second Circuit case, a female firefighter, also a com-
manding officer, experienced first-hand animosity from a male firefighter
about her inability to perform her job and inappropriate references re-
garding how she received her officer position.20 1 She complained that she
had been told by other firefighters that the co-worker made disparaging
and undermining remarks outside her presence as well.20 2 The court
noted that the plaintiff's testimony that other firefighters told her that the
alleged harasser made comments about her probably would not be admis-
sible at trial because it would be hearsay if offered to prove that the al-
leged harasser actually made the statements. 20 3
Federal Rule of Evidence 802 clarifies that hearsay is not admissible
unless allowed by an exception found elsewhere in the Rules.204 Rule
801 excludes certain statements from the definition of hearsay itself.20
5
193. Olle v. Columbia Univ., 136 F. App'x 383 (2d Cir. 2005).
194. Id. at 384.
195. Id.
196. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000); Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62,
69 (2d Cir. 2000).




201. Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 154-55 (2d Cir. 2000).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 155.
204. FED. R. EVID. 802.
205. See FED. R. EVID. 801.
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Because the plaintiff's statements in Howley that a firefighter told her
what the alleged harasser said do not fit an exemption or exception to the
hearsay rule, they are inadmissible hearsay.206 However, the middleman
(the firefighter who actually heard the statements while they were being
made) could testify notwithstanding the general prohibition on hearsay
because the statements would fall into an exemption to the hearsay defi-
nition-admission of a party opponent-presumably only so long as the
alleged harasser was joined as a defendant. 20 7 Even then, the defendant-
employer would have an argument that the statements should not be ad-
mitted to show employer liability, but should only be admitted against the
defendant-harasser.
If the middleman refuses to testify, then the plaintiff is left with nothing
but rumors that discriminatory comments were made about her, and with
no means to substantiate the rumors in a way to overcome the hearsay
rule. Seemingly odd is that the missing hearsay witness could in effect
make or break the plaintiff's hostile work environment claim.
More common than the Howley situation are cases where the plaintiff
seeks to introduce second-hand statements about other employees or
about a protected class generally-statements that do not single out and
are not directed at the plaintiff. The problem for the plaintiff becomes
how to get around the two links (at a minimum) in the chain of informa-
tion leading to the plaintiff. But, why should the plaintiff have an oppor-
tunity to recover based on hearing about events experienced by co-
workers at all?
Let us call the harasser "Person A," his target "Person B," and the
plaintiff "Person C." Person A makes a crude comment to Person B.
Person B, understandably offended, turns to Person C for empathy and
sympathy. One would imagine the conversation to frequently be the ba-
sic story: "Woe is me." The problem is that Person C is the one who sues.
But the story told to the jury is more along the lines of "Woe is Person
B." The attenuated logic in this situation is unique to hostile work envi-
ronment claims. The same chain of inferences is not permitted in per-
sonal injury cases, where perhaps the driver of a car in an accident had
been in a previous accident. The newly injured party cannot call the pre-
viously injured party to testify, and then recover based on the defendant's
bad driving in both accidents. The plaintiff ought to only be able to re-
cover for damage to him or herself, whether the damage is caused by an
abusive work environment or by a car accident.
B. HEARSAY OFFERED FOR ITS EFFECT ON THE LISTENER
The Advisory Committee's note to Rule 801 adheres to the common
law principle that utterances and conduct offered to prove their effect on
the listener are not hearsay. 20 8 In the following cases second-hand state-
206. See Howley, 217 F.3d at 154-55.
207. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
208. See FED. R. EvID. 801 advisory committee's note.
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ments were admitted over hearsay objections to show their effect on the
listeners.
1. Moore v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater
Chicago
In Moore v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chi-
cago, the plaintiff alleged sexual harassment, a sexually hostile work envi-
ronment, and also retaliation.20 9 The magistrate judge granted a motion
in limine to exclude testimony by the plaintiff's co-worker regarding inci-
dents that did not involve the plaintiff,210 and also "any testimony based
on rumors, gossip, and information [witness] heard after she left the...
plant. '211 But the magistrate judge failed to specify the specific grounds
for excluding the testimony after discussing the defendant's arguments
that the testimony was irrelevant, unduly prejudicial, lacked foundation,
and based on hearsay. 212 The motion was denied as to testimony by the
witness regarding incidents that involved the plaintiff.213
The magistrate judge also denied the defendant's motion in limine to
exclude evidence of a conversation allegedly overheard by one of the
plaintiff's co-workers. 214 The conversation, between three male co-work-
ers, allegedly involved a discussion regarding who would be the first per-
son to receive oral sex from the plaintiff.2 15 The witness who overheard
the conversation relayed its substance to the plaintiff.21 6 The magistrate
judge found that the information was relevant because the plaintiff knew
about it, and found that it was not hearsay because it was not offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted, but for its effect on the listener.217
This hearsay ruling was especially detrimental to the defendant's case
because, by allowing the witness to testify that he told the plaintiff about
the conversation, and what the conversation was about, evidence about
the conversation was admitted without first being proven true.218 Surely
one would anticipate, even expect, that a co-worker reporting gossip to its
target may use words quite different from those actually used and may
even embellish the substance of the conversation. More importantly,
should the plaintiff be allowed to recover on hearsay not offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted, but for its effect on her as a listener?
This implies that even untrue rumors can create an actionable hostile
209. Moore v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chi., No. 02 C 4040, 2004
WL 2958769, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 2004).
210. Id. at *8. The court excluded statements by the witness about sexually harassing
incidents that were unrelated to the plaintiff, (such as, "I have been in a situation where my











work environment claim. Some courts have apparently lost sight of the
Supreme Court's statement that "conduct must be extreme to amount to
a change in the terms and conditions of employment. '2 19
2. Velez v. QVC, Inc.
In Velez v. QVC, Inc., the district court found that a group of several
plaintiffs who passively heard about discriminatory events involving other
employees could show that their work environment was affected by the
comments. 220 The defendant attempted to exclude the plaintiffs' state-
ments that co-workers told them about other incidents of discrimination
as inadmissible hearsay. 22 1 Like the magistrate judge in Moore, the Velez
court found that the statements were offered to show their effect on the
listeners, and therefore were not hearsay. 222
The Velez court's reasoning allows the potential for rumors to cause a
hostile work environment without evidence that the underlying rumor-
sparking incidents actually happened. The context in Velez involved
plaintiffs repeating what co-workers had told them.2 23 The court did not
seem concerned with ensuring the accuracy of the stories told to the
plaintiffs, but only the effect of the stories on the plaintiffs.2 24 If the sto-
ries are untrue, then objectively there can be no effect on the plaintiff's
work environment.
The Velez court structured a two-part requirement to admit evidence of
events plaintiffs learn of second-hand. 22 5 First, the plaintiff "must show
subjective awareness of the discrimination directed at others. The court
must be able to assess whether the discrimination claimed, in fact, detri-
mentally affected the plaintiff. '2 26 Second, the plaintiff must show a
nexus between the discrimination directed towards the third party and
the discrimination aimed at the plaintiff.227 Expanding on the second re-
quirement, the court stated, "The relevant inquiry is [wihether. . . in light
of . . . incidents [directed at other employees], the incidents [that the
plaintiff] experienced more directly would reasonably be perceived and
[were] perceived, as hostile or abusive .... ",228 In other words, whether
the events the plaintiff learned of second-hand caused incidents the plain-
219. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).
220. Velez v. QVC, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d 384, 411-12 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
221. Id. at 411.
222. Id. at 411 n.23 (citing FED. R. EVID. 801(c); West v. Phila. Elec. Co. 45 F.3d 744,
751 (3d Cir. 1995)). West allowed evidence of an incident of racial discrimination that the
plaintiff learned about while employed by the defendant to show the effect of the incident
on the plaintiff as well as the employer's knowledge that the work environment was ra-
cially hostile. West, 45 F.3d at 757.
223. Velez, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 411 n.23.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 410.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 411.
228. Id. (quoting Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 1997)) (altera-
tions in original) (internal quotation omitted).
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tiff him or herself experienced to be perceived as more hostile or abusive
than if the plaintiff had been unaware of the third-party incidents.
After quoting the distilled nexus requirement from Schwapp, the court
elaborated on Schwapp's emphasis that "summary judgment may be in-
appropriate, because this inquiry involves factual issues best resolved by
the trier of fact."'229 This elaboration on the requirement provides the
most potent description of the extent to which the court is willing to allow
second-hand evidence:
Under this approach the court retains the flexibility to evaluate com-
plex employment environments, like QVC, where ostensibly "differ-
ent" types of discrimination may actually be inextricably linked. For
example, an employer who discriminates against some on the basis of
national origin, others on the basis of race, and a third group on the
basis of gender, may really be discriminating against anyone who is
not a white male. See Rauh v. Coyne, 744 F. Supp. 1181, 1183
(D.D.C. 1990). Therefore, under certain circumstances, considering
the claims of all three groups as separate and distinct from each
other would fail to yield a comprehensive picture of a common envi-
ronment that might be hostile to members of different protected
classes for equally impermissible reasons.2 30
In applying the nexus requirement to the particular facts, the court
continued:
Whether an inference of discrimination is appropriate under the cir-
cumstances may depend on factors such as: (1) whether the discrimi-
natory acts directed at others were undertaken by the same
decisionmaker who is alleged to have discriminated against plaintiff,
(2) whether the acts directed at plaintiff and those directed at other
employees occurred in close temporal proximity, and (3) whether the
type of discrimination complained of by plaintiff and that directed at
other employees is similar in nature or kind. In other words, could a
reasonable jury conclude that under the circumstances the discrimi-
nation of which the plaintiff complains is sufficiently similar in time,
nature, and kind to that suffered by other employees to disclose the
perpetrator's signature.231
The problem with the court's framework is that the time, nature, and kind
of the discrimination directed towards other employees are only factors
to be considered, not strict requirements. Only if other discriminatory
incidents are required to be similar to the plaintiff's experience in time,
nature, and type will the incidents truly bear relation to one another.
The court's requirement that other discriminatory acts be similar in na-
ture and kind to those experienced by the plaintiff conflicts with the
court's allowance of evidence that employees not in the plaintiff's pro-
tected class were discriminated against.2 32 While the "nature" of the dis-
229. Id. at 411.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 412.
232. See id. at 411.
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crimination could be the same, for example derogatory comments or
insulting graffiti, the "kind" of discrimination seems to point to the class
discriminated against, such as women or African-Americans. 233 In Velez,
the incidents experienced first-hand and incidents directed toward other
employees tended to center around minorities being treated less favora-
bly than Caucasian employees, and a collective belief of several employ-
ees, including the plaintiffs, that the defendant had lightened their skin
tone in advertisements.2 34 Perhaps the similarity and group presentation
of the Velez plaintiffs' claims caused the court to overlook the breadth of
its language in setting out factors to be considered in the nexus
determination.
VII. CONCLUSION
BIFURCATION AND MORE UNIFORM STANDARDS ARE THE ANSWERS.
As the discussion of the case law indicates, many courts admit second-
hand evidence over defense objections. Some decisions allow the evi-
dence upon finding that the unfair prejudice to the defendant does not
substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence on the hostile
work environment issue.235 Other courts reject relevance arguments be-
cause the evidence is probative to peripheral issues in the case that go to
employer liability or the amount of damages that can be awarded. While
second-hand evidence may be relevant to these determinations, particu-
larly when the plaintiff alleges a hostile work environment based on har-
assment by a co-worker, these elements need not be proved initially. The
unfair prejudice of the evidence would be greatly reduced by first admit-
ting only evidence that directly relates to the plaintiff and allowing the
trier of fact to determine whether or not the plaintiff suffered an objec-
tively and subjectively hostile work environment. If not, the trial should
end. If so, then the trial should proceed to the issues of liability and dam-
ages. Bifurcating trials in this manner would increase efficiency, reduce
the cost to the parties and the courts, and decrease the effect of unfairly
prejudicial second-hand evidence on the defendant.
In arguing for bifurcation, or for a Rule 403 objection, defendants must
argue that second-hand evidence confuses the jury by requiring them to
evaluate incidents that do not involve the plaintiff for truthfulness, possi-
ble effect on the plaintiff, and probable effect on a reasonable person in
the plaintiff's position. Second-hand evidence requires that mini-trials be
held within the plaintiff's trial. If the plaintiff succeeds in convincing the
jury that the events involving third parties created a hostile work environ-
ment, the third parties who were the true victims of those incidents are
not compensated. Instead, the plaintiff receives a windfall. And finally,
233. See id. at 411-12.
234. Id. at 412-13.
235. See FED. R. EVID. 403. See, e.g., Mason v. S. Ill. Univ. at Carbondale, 233 F.3d
1036, 1045 (7th Cir. 2000).
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even if a limiting instruction is issued, the unfair prejudice of the evidence
cannot be sufficiently diluted to prevent the jury from using it to hold the
defendant liable-even if it is held liable to the wrong person.
Too few defendants bring up lack of personal knowledge when faced
with second-hand evidence. The personal knowledge objection should be
made before any hearsay objection so that the substance of the testimony
is attacked prior to the form. When the witness only heard about a dis-
criminatory or harassing incident, then the witness is unqualified to testify
about the incident because he did not perceive it. Only if the personal
knowledge objection is overruled should the defendant argue hearsay. If
the plaintiff responds that the statements are offered for their effect on
the plaintiff-listener, then the defendant must vigorously oppose the
statements on the grounds that allowing rumors to create a hostile work
environment without proof that the rumored events are true would be
illogical.
The solution to the disparity among the circuits is to have a more con-
crete standard for the admission of second-hand evidence. In conjunction
with the practice of bifurcating trials, during the first phase a blanket rule
should be instituted that only incidents the plaintiff perceived first-hand
may be presented. This would include words the plaintiff heard, inappro-
priate actions the plaintiff saw, and also the plaintiff's perception of more
concrete evidence such as graffiti and inappropriate cartoons that are in
view in the workplace. Only after the initial determination is made on
the evidence directly involving the plaintiff should second-hand evidence
be argued for its value in helping the jury determine the peripheral issues.
Employers must be aggressive when responding to hostile work envi-
ronment claims. Bifurcation of the issues should be pursued early in the
case so that discovery can proceed accordingly. Until the legislature or
the Supreme Court adopts a uniform rule for its admission, second-hand
evidence must be vigorously attacked for both its substance and technical
form.
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